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Recent Development:
Interspousal Tort Immunity
Karen L. Sussman
In Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462
A.2d 506 (1983), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland abrogated the doctrine of in-
terspousal tort immunity. This doctrine
prohibited a person from suing his or her
spouse in any tort action.
In Boblitz, the wife brought a tort action
against her husband for injuries she sus-
tained in a motor vehicle accident. She
alleged negligence against her husband
in his operation of the motor vehicle. The
husband filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, relying on a Maryland case, Hud-
son v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d
339 (1961), in which the interspousal tort
immunity rule was upheld. The trial court
granted summary judgment relying on
Hudson, as cited in Lusby v. Lusby, 283
Md. 334, 345, 390 A.2d 77, 82 (1978),
finding that the interspousal tort immunity
rule was still good law in Maryland. How-
ever, in Boblitz the court of appeals ab-
rogated the interspousal immunity rule as
to cases sounding in negligence.
The court's opinion begins by tracing
the history of the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. This doctrine was created by
judicial decisions and was based on the
archaic concept that by marriage, "the
husband and wife are one person in law;
that is, the very being or legal existence
of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the hus-
band .. " 296 Md. at 244, 462 A.2d at
507 citing Blackstone. As the court of ap-
peals pointed out, the doctrine would more
aptly be called "a rule in derogation of
married women."
In 1898, the Maryland legislature en-
acted the "Married Women's Act" (codi-
fied as MD. ANN. CODE, art. 45 § 5), which
was the first recognition of women's rights
separate from those of their husbands.
This act gave married women the right to
contract for themselves, to contract with
their husbands, and to sue or be sued in
their own name. Unfortunately, the Act
did not specifically give women the right
to sue their husbands for actions in tort.
In 1910, the Supreme Court of the United
States in Thompson v. Thompson, 218
U.S. 611 (1910) found that the District of
Columbia's Married Women's Act, an act
similar to Maryland's, was not intended
to give a right of action in tort to a wife
against her husband. Subsequent litiga-
tion in many jurisdictions concerning the
continuing viability of the interspousal tort
immunity rule was heavily influenced by
the Thompson decision.
At the time of the Boblitz decision, thirty-
five states had abrogated the inter-
spousal tort immunity doctrine either fully
or partially. Two states imposed the doc-
trine by statute.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland examined some of the reasons
asserted for retaining the interspousal tort
immunity rule: the unity of husband and
wife will be preserved; interspousal tort
actions will destroy the harmony of the
marital relationship; retention of the doc-
trine will prevent collusive and fraudulent
claims; retention of the doctrine will guard
against an increase in trivial claims; di-
vorce and criminal courts furnish ade-
quate redress; and change is solely within
the purview of the legislature.
The court held that these reasons do
not withstand careful scrutiny. The court
further stated that the rule was unsound
in the circumstances of modern life. While
the court did not explicitly state the basis
for its holding, it was in accord with the
majority of states.
Citing decisions from other jurisdictions
in which the interspousal tort immunity
rule was abrogated, the court proceeded
point by point to dispel the arguments for
retaining the doctrine. As to the argument
that it would destroy the unity of husband
and wife: "[t]he doctrine ... cannot be
supported by an antiquated and narrow
'unity' doctrine that perpetuates the fiction
of female disability if not inferiority ... "
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 881
(Ark. 1982). In response to the argument
that it would disrupt family harmony: "[i]t
is difficult to perceive how any law barring
access to the courts for personal injuries
will promote harmony .. " Coffindaffer
v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E. 2d 338 (W.Va.
1978). As to prevention of collusive and
fraudulent claims: "It would be a sad
commentary on the law if we were to ad-
mit that the judicial processes are so in-
effective that we must deny relief to a
person otherwise entitled simply because
in some future case a litigant may be guilty
of fraud or collusion. Once that concept
was accepted, then all causes of actions
should be abolished. Our legal system is
not that ineffectual." Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal.2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 73 (1962). In
response to adequate redress being
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States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Maryland, Baltimore Division, the judge
sets an ideal fee for particular types of
bankruptcy, and issues a Show Cause
order as to why the fee should not be
diminished if the amount listed in the pe-
tition exceeds the limit the judge has set.
The court does not disclose the actual
amount of the maximum fees allowable.
While this non-disclosure protects some
bankruptcy estates from overreaching by
the debtor's attorney, it also deprives at-
torneys of guidelines to determine fair and
equitable fees. In fact, this practice pro-
motes litigation by failing to provide scru-
pulous attorneys with assistance in set-
ting fees and by chastizing them after the
fees are set. With the immense number
of bankruptcy cases filed each year, there
is little chance that each case will be ex-
amined to determine if the fees charged
are reasonable. If there is no objection to
the amount, the court allows the com-
pensation if it does not exceed its limit.
While attorneys have the ethical obli-
gation to charge a reasonable fee,30 with-
out standards to guide them the task is
difficult. There appear to be three stand-
ards applied when dealing with attorneys'
fees in bankruptcy: the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the Bankruptcy
Code, and caselaw (such as First Colo-
nial). While these standards appear to
overlap, it is unclear how they are in-
tended to interact, when they are in-
tended to apply, and which takes prec-
edence. If the court determines that a fee
is excessive, should a complaint be filed
with the Ethics Committee? If a fee is
found to be excessive, is it per se uneth-
ical? These questions and more need to
be answered.
Conclusion
In order to protect unwary clients and
to prevent subsequent litigation, the local
bar associations should examine attor-
neys' fees and develop recommenda-
tions as to what fees are reasonable. The
present standards in DR 2-106 are
ambiguous: "[a] fee is clearly excessive
when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer
of ordinary prudence would be left with a
definite and firm conviction that the fee is
in excess of a reasonable fee. '" 31 (em-
phasis added.) Without guidelines, the at-
torney may, even without so intending,
charge a fee that is later considered to
be excessive. The reluctance on the part
of the bar associations to establish guide-
lines is an overreaction to the prohibition
against fixing clearly improper minimum
fees.32
In the absence of sufficient guidelines,
however, attorneys should take it upon
themselves to ascertain reasonable rates
in the community and attempt to keep
them to a minimum. Although the Code
no longer requires economy in fees, the
bankruptcy bar should consider it their
ethical obligation under DR 2-106 to
charge lower-than-normal fees to clients
who contract for their services because
of financial problems. Rather than re-
maining silent, creditors should also be-
come more involved by objecting to fees
which appear excessive. In many liqui-
dation cases, the amount received by the
debtor's attorney for bankruptcy matters
may equal half of the amount owed to
creditors. These fees, however, do not
trigger the court's alarm by exceeding the
amount set for liquidation cases. Height-
ened awareness of the ethical obligation
should benefit both the petitioner and the
creditor in many bankruptcy cases.
* Kimberly Armstrong is a third-year law stu-
dent at the University of Baltimore School of
Law who has been working in the area of
bankruptcy.
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available in divorce and criminal courts:
"The criminal law may vindicate society's
interest in punishing a wrongdoer but it
cannot compensate an injured spouse for
her or his suffering and damages. Divorce
or separation provide escape from tor-
tious abuse but can hardly be equated
with a civil right to redress and compen-
sation for personal injuries." Merenoff v.
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951, 962
(1978).
Justice Couch, joined by Justice Ro-
dowsky, dissented in Boblitz, based on
his belief that such a change would be
best made by the legislature. The majority
held that in the present case there existed
no legislative barrier to the abrogation of
the doctrine, since it was a common law
rule brought about by judicial decisions.
The court further stated that the doctrine
of stare decisis should not be construed
as a prohibition against changing a rule
of law that has become unsound in the
circumstances of modern life.
While the decision in Boblitz may be
viewed as a giant step forward in Mary-
land tort law, there are circumstances in
which the interspousal immunity rule may
still apply. The court stated that certain
conduct that would be tortious between
strangers would not be tortious between
spouses due to the mutual concessions
implied in the marital relationship. The
doctrine of intra-family tort immunity was
untouched by the Boblitz decision. The
court also limited its holding to cases
sounding in negligence and did not ad-
dress cases which involved intentional
torts.
